Introduction
The genocide of 1994 was anything but a surprise for the international community. It was the culmination of many years of cynical indifference and wilful blindness to the plight of the Rwandan people. In the words of the then Rwandan representative to the Security Council: "Since 1959 Rwanda has repeatedly experienced collective massacres, which, as early as 1964, were described by Pope Paul VI and two Nobel * LL.B (Hons) (Moi); LL.M (Cantab); PhD (Melb). Lecturer in law, University of Newcastle (Australia) 1 The number of persons killed throughout the territory is to be numbered in the hundreds of thousands, estimates ranging from 200,000 to 500,000. In fact, even the latter figure is probably less than the reality. Some observers think that the figure is close to a million. It is not sure that the exact number of victims will ever be known. 2 SC Res 955, UN SCOR, 49th Year, 3453rd mtg., UN Doc S/RES/955 (1994). 3 UN SCOR, 49th Sess, 3453d mtg, UN Doc S/PV.3453 (1994) 7. 4 Ibid, para. 14. 5 The ICTR's sister tribunal in Yugoslavia, the ICTFY, was clearer about what it believed to be its objectives by interpreting its mandate from the Security Council. They are, to bring to justice those responsible; to contribute to ensuring that such violations are halted and effectively redressed by acting as a powerful deterrent to all parties against continued participation in inhuman acts; to gradually promote an end to armed hostilities; to be a tool for promoting reconciliation by working to attribute acts to individuals and thereby provide justice to individual victims to diminish group hatred and the need for Nagasaki". 10 The genocide was the culmination of several prior mass killing orgies. It was a well-organised and coordinated event.
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Immediately preceding and during the Rwandan genocide, the political instrumentalisation of ethnicity was so focused and so pointed that Hutu were led to believe -and many actually believed -that they were doing good by killing Tutsi. The genocide was not about ethnic identity operating as a constitutive element of Rwandans' personal identity. Rather, the genocide was about ethnicity operating coercively as the unwavering, singular expression of good or evil, of 'us' and 'them'.
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The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) grew out of the response of the UN human rights system to the Rwandan tragedy. Parallel to the efforts within the UN human rights system, the government of Rwanda that came to power by toppling the genocidal regime 13 made a request to the UN Security Council for assistance to bring those responsible for the genocide to justice. 14 Based on its concern that the serious and extensive human rights violations in Rwanda would disrupt international peace and security, 15 the Security Council invoked its Chapter VII authority under the UN Charter and established the ICTR "for the sole purpose of prosecuting persons responsible for genocide and other serious violations of international humanitarian law committed in the territory of Rwanda, and Rwandan citizens responsible for genocide and other such violations committed in the territory of [neighbouring] States, between 1 January 1994 and 31 December 1994." 16 The preamble of the Resolution states the main objectives of the International Tribunal to be those of accountability, deterrence and a desire to contribute to national reconciliation and the maintenance of peace. It is against these objectives that the performance of the ICTR should be gauged. 17 As indicated by the preambular paragraphs of Security Council Resolution 955 of 1994, the ICTR hopes to deter the culture of impunity by confronting it with accountability and thus defusing the cyclical waves of mass killings that plague Rwanda. The Security Council, ... Expressing once again its grave concern at the reports indicating that genocide and other systematic, widespread and flagrant violations of international humanitarian law have been committed in Rwanda, ... Determined to put an end to such crimes and to take effective measures to bring to justice the persons responsible for them, Convinced that in the particular circumstances of Rwanda, the prosecution of persons responsible for genocide and the above-mentioned violations of international humanitarian law would enable this aim to be achieved and would contribute to the process of national reconciliation and to the restoration and maintenance of peace, Believing that the establishment of an international tribunal for the prosecution of persons responsible for the above-mentioned violations of international humanitarian law will contribute to ensuring that such violations are halted and effectively redressed. . . .
The ICTR was intended to bring justice to the most serious perpetrators of the genocide and other violations of international humanitarian law and to ensure that such violations do not reoccur. 18 However, while courts are needed to enforce law, courts, however, do not and cannot make human rights real. The achievement of human rights is a much more complex process than the establishment of a court. While the Rwanda tribunal responded to the lawyer's gradualist approach to institutional and normative development of international criminal law, it initially failed to successfully address the basic purposes for which it was established, to end impunity and deter potential offenders. It has been hampered by conceptual considerations.
To delve more deeply into the ICTR's handicap in addressing the human right's situation in Rwanda through the international penal process, this Article makes use of a distinction of looking at human, social or for that matter world affairs: the actororientated and structure-orientated perspectives. 19 They can be seen as two ways of reflecting, and reflecting on, social affairs and legal tradition, each of them focusing on different aspects. The legal paradigm (especially criminal law) is biased in favour of the actor-oriented perspective due to its simplistic concreteness, identification of the evil actor, apprehension and prosecution. This Article sets out to consider the initial focus of the ICTR on classical criminal law theory and the failings of this in fulfilling the broader objectives of the international penal process which transcend the prosecution and conviction of guilty persons. The Article then moves on to consider the significance of restorative justice paradigms in reconstructing the post-genocidal society before concluding with positive trends and transformations that the international and domestic 18 Ibid. paras. society may not be possible. By assigning guilt to the leader-instigators, the tribunal may also lift the burden of collective guilt that settles on the Hutus, whose leaders directed or ordered such terrible violence. The assignment of guilt by a neutral tribunal may also enable the international community to differentiate between victims and aggressors. However the international justice process could not erase the fact that the interethnic conflict while not genetically inbred, is firmly embedded in the sociocultural structure and subconscious of the Rwandan society and thus addressing this structural defects is part of the process of deterrence.
The initial sole focus on the ICTR indictees was unrealistic and demonstrated that the
Tribunal was unclear about why it existed and how it could make its modest contribution for the betterment of human rights in the region. 22 There is an abundance of the 'evil' ones, those who have already through their acts proved that they are evil, as well as those who may be suspected of harbouring evil intentions. The causes of the Rwandan tragedy rest with them, expressed in their acts or threats or general inclination to engage in evil acts but the fact is that the international penal process will only try a minuscule fraction of the whole group of perpetrators, the indictees. 23 So many people were killed principally because there were so many killers. 28 The renowned African scholar, A. A. Mazrui, noted that 'violations of human rights are preceded by a process of psychic sub humanisation' by which the violator 'sub humanises his victim in his own imagination,' although 'residual humanity is often necessary to give meaning to the sin of inter-human cruelty'. Such dehumanisation, he explained, is the 'reverse of the psychology of love' because no human being can love a non-human object 'unless the object undergoes psychic humanization in the imagination of the lover'. When someone loves her dog 'it is because the dog has been, in some sense, anthropomorphized,' and when someone loves his 'motherland' it is because his imagination 'has invoked a metaphor of human kinship' with the territory. The psychology of hate, on the other hand, requires 'a partial reduction of humanity'. Since it is difficult to hate an inanimate object or animal, the most fertile soil for hatred is that ' Tutsis may themselves see the Tribunal and the genocide trials they are conducting in 35 Criminal enterprise behaviour is a type of behaviour that invariably arises as a natural social phenomenon in nearly every society. It is a social epidemic that takes different forms at different times across these societies, but because its etiology so differs from that of individual criminal behaviour, its effect on society and its demand of a response from the justice system is markedly different as well. Crime as part of a criminal enterprise almost always results in selective and discriminatory enforcement of laws. The use of discretion in dealing with these offences by a criminal justice system offers an opportunity for criminal forces to strongly influence the justice process itself. In a sense, a functional 'tolerance policy' by law enforcement bureaucracies may develop and often does. When responding to crime as part of a criminal enterprise, social control bureaucracies are confronted with the vexing problem of enforcing laws about which little, sporadic, or inconsistent social consensus among society's many groups may be discerned. See J. R. Gusfield, Symbolic Crusade: Status Politics and the American Temperance Movement (University of Illinois Press, Urbana, 1963). The community's ruling elite inevitably finds itself in an odd position, a position which potentially can severely challenge its authority as a justice insurer. The ruling elite must select which values within the community it must advance and then either selectively enforce laws and punishments, or attempt to obliterate a portion or all of the class of violators. Irrespective of this problem, if a justice system is to respond in an effective way to organised, crimes it must seek, quite naturally, to develop its coalition of support in order to expand not only its budgetary/personnel resources and their enforcement power, but its will to pass and enforce laws proscribing the offensive behaviours. See H. S. Becker, Outsiders: Studies in the Sociology of Deviance (Free Press, New York, 1963). 36 Credibility of the Rwanda Tribunal is unlikely to materialise among Hutus because they are its main targets. The prosecution of Tutsis is essential for the tribunal's legitimacy. In the case of the Yugoslav Tribunal, the prosecution of Bosnians and Croats -and not just Serbs -would enhance that tribunal's legitimacy in the eyes of perpetrators across the board.
Rwanda as their opportunity for revenge. 37 The ICTR being initially obsessed by a need to be neutral and independent distanced itself from the overall political settlement of the Hutu-Tutsi struggle for political power and thus was virtually irrelevant to the future of Rwanda.
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What the ICTR (and the international community) hoped to achieve in the euphoric early days of the ICTR soon fell victim to the reality of the structural underpinning of the genocide. The ICTR hoped to bring about a discontinuous jump, by breaking the vicious cycle of human rights violations through an international presence that was little felt in Rwanda itself. It was not apparent then that the deep-seated animosity between the two segments of the Rwandan population would not dispel easily by a few years of international justice. The animosity and hatred was cultivated, reinforced and manipulated for over six decades by the colonial powers, then well nurtured by the Hutu leaders who ascended to power after independence. It has taken close to a century to achieve a well-entrenched social structure pegged on ethnic stratification, founded on deep-seated hatred. 39 This is not to say that the effort at prosecution is an exercise in futility. Obviously there are actors around otherwise the structure would not operate.
Individual guilt, leading to prosecution is important, but it should not detract from the flaws in the Rwandan social structure. The actor-oriented perspective draws its strength from its simplistic concreteness; its ability at capturing concrete actors; the individuals.
But only a segment of an actor is in the structure, and only a part of the structure shows 
A Leaky Sieve? The Pitfalls of Classical Criminal Law Theory
Virtually all theories of criminal justice can be characterized as either retributive or deterrent (utilitarian). 41 For utilitarians punishment is justified to the extent it produces a socially desirable consequence, ordinarily general deterrence. consequences are irrelevant for retributionists. Rather they consider it simply morally fitting that criminal offenders are punished. 43 Described by R. Solomon, "the desire for retribution is the desire for vengeance (,)…getting even, putting the world back in balance". 44 The international penal process at the ICTR was initially firmly focused on deterrent and retributive aspects of the criminal process with little pragmatic effort to incorporate rehabilitative and restorative aspects into its overall strategy.
The Deterrence Theory
Whether the offence is tax evasion or genocide, deterrence theory presupposes a rational, utility-maximizing actor. Persons commit crimes, so the theory goes, when the expected value of doing so exceeds the cost of punishment. To reduce crime, society need only raise the price by imposing harsh penalties. While the Rwandan courts received mixed, and to a degree improving, reviews, many of the first trials were considered a disaster from a due process perspective. Most of the more than 125,000 detainees were arbitrarily arrested and have been detained for long periods without trial. 69 To many in Rwanda, this process negatively colours their impression of the Rwandan government and its ability to fairly treat those accused of genocide. The Rwandan trials will not help achieve reconciliation if they are considered unfair or if they are removed from the population. 70 Rwanda itself warned when advocating for the creation of a tribunal with international participation of 'victor's justice' if it organised the trials on its own.
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It would seem the case in Rwanda, that lasting reconciliation requires assigning individual responsibility for the atrocities, while it is imperative that trials of those accused take place, clearly, the most resonant of such trials will be those in Rwanda, organised and accomplished by the Rwandan people, so that individual responsibility is an internal, rather than an external designation. 72 It follows that the high profile of the ICTR, was overshadowing and stealing the 'thunder' from the national trials rather than complementing them. The ICTR had just about all the 'big fish' while the rest were left to the Rwandan national courts.
The major reason why the international and national justice systems were failing to respond adequately to the Rwandan situation is that they inadequately focused on the crimes by defining them only as law breaking. The concentration is then solely on the 69 For an interesting history of the Rwandan government's attempt to respond to the genocide and mass killings with its justice system, see Schabas, supra note 45, p. 523. 70 Although the understanding of a community's perception of law and legal process is underdeveloped, especially in a place like Rwanda, fairness and morality are important. 83 Starting in 1999, the Rwandan government implemented a national policy which required many people to abandon their homes in order to be housed in new 'villages' or settlements known locally as imidugudu. In the northwestern préfectures of Gisenyi and Ruhengeri, in particular, families were forced to move, sometimes under threat and intimidation. Some were made to destroy their old homes but were not provided with assistance to construct new ones. The policy was officially designed to improve security and ensure greater facilities and infrastructure, but by the end of 1999 living conditions for hundreds of thousands -especially in the northwest -remained very poor. Amnesty International Report, infra note 89. Such structural strategies are definitely wrong, at least the aggressive and abrasive stance by the government. In implementation. Arbitrary arrests and detentions were reported. Unsubstantiated accusations of participation in the genocide were frequently used as a way of settling scores or to prevent property owners from reclaiming illegally occupied property. Now this falls in the structure-oriented perspective. It catches types of evil, repression (political) and exploitation (economic depends instead on law, Gandhi concluded that "law ceases to be law, and society ceases to be society".
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The inter-ethnic hatred in Rwanda is a 'deep-culture', a socio-cultural code embedded in the collective subconscious of the group entities, defining for that collective that it is normal/natural to adopt a 'no-holds-barred' approach to gaining ethnical supremacy and the "inability to agree on certain fundamental points, beyond compromise, regarding the proposed commission's terms of reference." 96 It would appear that this was a politically motivated action based on the Prosecutor's investigation of crimes allegedly committed by the Rwanda Patriotic Army soldiers affiliated with the current government. 97 The Prosecutor later brought the dispute before the UN Security Council, noting that the attitude of the Government toward the tribunal had "hardened" because the ICTR began investigations of individuals with connections to the current Rwandan army. 98 The Rwandan government soon backed away from its contentious policies but not after a sweetener was thrown its way, a freeze on investigations of RPF, yet another blow to the overall bid for reconciliation. Later in 2002, the frosty relations thawed when Chief Prosecutor, C. Ponte, announced her intention to transfer forty suspects to Rwanda and other national jurisdictions for prosecutions bringing to fruition a promise made almost two years earlier. 99 In addition, the Security Council granted the ICTR's request to create a pool of eighteen ad litem judges to supplement the work of the nine trial judges already sitting on the ICTR with an aim of increased speed and efficiency after enacting similar reforms for the ICTY. Patriotic Front (RPF). 101 The RPF is the rebel movement that seized power after the massacres in Rwanda, and remains in power as Rwanda's current government. The failure of the ICTR to indict RPF members exposed the Tribunal to criticisms of being a "victor's tribunal." 102 The ICTR chief prosecutor not only intends to investigate RPF members, but initially publicly secured the cooperation of the Rwandan government in this endeavour. ('Genocide Law') and created a special judicial chamber to try the genocide cases an effort to hold individuals who will not be prosecuted by the ICTR responsible for international humanitarian law violations. The law created 13 specialised chambers within the court structure to deal with cases flowing from the genocide. 111 The Rwandan judicial system, however, still is not capable of enforcing the Constitution and other laws, honouring the rights of the accused, or processing cases within a reasonable time frame. 112 Although the status of the special chamber created to hear genocide cases and the judicial system as a whole has improved since 1994, the judiciary continues to suffer from inadequate resources, inefficiency, corruption, and executive influence. 113 As few individuals with legal training were left in the country after the 1994 conflict, the country has struggled to find replacements for these key positions. 114 Many of the judges are subject to threats of death or bodily injury and occasional influence by the government. 115 The shortage of prosecutors and defence attorneys also has made it difficult to establish fair trials. Those individuals who do serve these functions are also susceptible to threats.
Accusations have been made that prosecutors or defence counsels who readily support the rights of the accused will themselves become susceptible to charges of genocide.
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The accused are entitled to a defence attorney under the 1996 genocide law, but the state will not provide one if the accused is indigent.
Many people who are incarcerated have not yet had charges brought against them. With the help of foreign assistance, case files were created for over fifty percent of the detainees in 1998. 117 Periodically, the government releases thousands of suspects for which the prosecution has no case files. ather than ending the cycles of revenge, the trials themselves were revenge". 123 No doubt the Hutu extremists will be itching for a chance to pay back the Tutsis in their own coin in the future.
In the past seven years since the passage of the domestic Genocide Law, over 5,000
defendants have been processed by the specialized chambers 124 however this though extremely impressive is inadequate. Senior judicial officials of the ICTR have noted that at the current processing speed it would likely take "400 years to try the 120,000
people" in Rwandan prisons. 125 In view of the slow pace of trials and the citizenry's continued cries for justice, in July 1997, the government of Rwanda began contemplating alternatives to dealing with the huge numbers of detainees, the slow pace of trials and the lack of national reconciliation. It established a National Unity and The Gacaca Law preserves the basic structure of offences and the procedures for confessions and guilty pleas established by the Genocide Law, which formed the basis for domestic genocide trials. 133 Specifically, it classifies detainees into one of four categories according to their alleged participation in particular crimes. "As in the Genocide Law, the Gacaca Law provides an incentive for defendants to confess and plead guilty in exchange for a reduced sentence. For both confession procedures, half of the defendant's sentence will be served in custody while the rest is commuted into community service." 134 The gacaca system could have potentially positive or negative effects on achieving accountability and reconciliation in Rwanda. On the positive side, gacaca could ease the burden on the courts and prison system by helping to quickly process the innocent and guilty. The process also could have a cathartic effect by allowing many individuals in society to discuss the genocide, participate in the creation of justice and a standard of responsibility for criminal actions, and more swiftly deal with recent traumatic events.
Gacaca advocates argue that gacaca is a more efficient solution for Rwanda because rehabilitative penalties can be quickly assigned if "the moral force of the village [is used] to shame perpetrators into admitting the truth." 135 Some Rwandans, who feel that Western-style justice is not working, believe this kind of group justice will serve as a tool for reconciliation. 136 For example, Rwandan Justice Minister J. Mucyo, believes that the gacaca system will lead to truth for the whole society whereas western-style justice only leads to a small part of the truth for the accused, the judge, and the victims. 137 This view is echoed by P. Ironside who observes:
"In the context of post-genocidal Rwanda, Gacaca may well be able to heal the deep wounds that continue to divide the country by ethnicity in a manner for which Western retributive systems are not designed. Indeed, it is unrealistic, impractical and short-sighted to rely solely on the ordinary criminal law model with all of its due process guarantees to address mass perpetration of crimes, particularly in a country whose judicial system has to be built ex nihilo and where ethnic tensions continue to run high." 138 Observers however have expressed a number of concerns with the gacaca system. There are several other disadvantages to the gacaca system. As P. Ironside cautions "… many of its features resemble those of the criminal justice system but without all of the accompanying procedural safeguards, which raises concerns as to whether the new system will simply amount to criminal justice in the guise of popular justice." 144 In a further sobering reflection, Ironside observes that "Notwithstanding its capacity to yield beneficial, indeed essential, results, the Gacaca system also raises a number of valid concerns. For instance, while the process may heal some wounds, it could actually reopen others and thereby exacerbate ethnic tensions. The potential also exists that the government's motives are not altogether virtuous in instituting the Gacaca system, but rather stem from the increasing rate of acquittals by the specialized chambers, which the government may wish to curb by subjecting defendants to Gacaca's community justice." 145 Overall then, the process could breed the spirit of vengeance and bitterness and help continue the culture of impunity instead of prevent it. Individuals participating in these processes might fabricate stories in order to seek revenge against certain individuals, feel reluctant to hold their families and neighbours accountable, or see this not as an opportunity to seek justice, but revenge. 146 If these shortcomings could be dealt with, however, gacaca could have a significant impact by helping individuals realize on a personal level that they live in a society with accountability, law, and justice. In summary, although the Rwandan justice system still has a long way to go 143 Morris, supra note 9, pp. before becoming a model of impartiality and justice, international observers have reported that it has continued to make progress since the 1994 conflict.
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The Rwandan government has taken further steps outside the traditional adversarial legal system to deal with the genocide in the past and to prevent mass atrocities in the future. In 1999 the Rwandan government established a National Human Rights Commission (NHRC) and a National Unity and Reconciliation Commission (NURC). 
Conclusion
The UN and the international community were initially lulled into thinking that justice would come to Rwanda with an 'effective' ICTR, which was succeeding in securing custody of many of its indictees. A few years down the road, it was clear that the genocide in Rwanda was in fact the product of years of human rights violations 151 and that an intense, creative, and sustained intervention involving the Rwandan government, civil society actors, UN entities, international financial institutions, and bilateral funding agencies was therefore needed to address the full spectrum of human rights.
If the ideal is to facilitate positive social change in Rwanda that brings about reconciliation and the respect for human rights, a system based on ill-thought-out symbolic justice or attainable mass retribution had to be re-oriented with a more thought-out and creative strategy regarding the structure and operation of the ICTR and a synergy with Rwandan domestic penal process. An actor-oriented perspective alone cannot prevent future human rights violations in Rwanda. It is unable to react adequately to social evils built into the social structure of the Rwandan society. The experience of the past nine years shows that the vicious cycle of violence, though somewhat muted, is very much alive. 152 The Gacaca system provides an innovative and practical blend of retributive and restorative justice since it is within communities that most of the atrocities took place during the genocide yet victims were initially largely alienated from the international and domestic by distance, procedure and lack of 151 For example, the lack of sufficient access to quality public education created some of the conditions whereby leaders could manipulate large portions of the population; these leaders promoted the lack of tolerance and institutionalised difference between societal groups. 152 A leader of one of the opposition groups composed mainly of Hutu extremists in an interview stated that the struggle will never end equating the laying down of arms before their demands are met which inter alia include the return to the 1992 Constitution as amounting to an acceptance of guilt to some communication. "Because Gacaca is based on local culture, it is likely to create from the beginning a greater sense of familiarity, respect, trust and commitment to the process than the Western judicial system. As members of the community, Gacaca judges will have a sense of the full measure of injury that the community has suffered and can lead hearings to address those facts." 153 However there are valid grounds that despite its overall philosophy based on traditional dispute resolution, the system has significant penal characteristics albeit with few or no procedural safeguards against error or abuse. 154 The Rwandan government must maintain active vigilance over the process lest it becomes a conduit for settling scores-real and imagined.
It is evident that the ugliness of the genocidal conflagration and the political reality of the ethnic hatred cannot be isolated into an international courtroom for resolution. The experience to attend ICTR trial sessions a move that is of enormous benefit to the newly trained jurists. In addition the ICTR has increasingly turned to a policy of generally enforcing its sentences in African prisons. 155 The aim is not only to correct its image in
Rwanda and Africa as a multi-million dollar Western conscience cleaning exercise but also to shed its image as a ritzy court that guarantees the guilty tickets to 'luxurious' European prisons. In addition it seeks to have a greater deterrent effect against impunity Africa, a continent that has largely come to be associated with despotic rulers, civil strife and sovereign excesses.
Even as the Rwandan government moves to try individuals handed over from the ICTR, it ought to bear in mind the need to both chastise the Hutus but also absolve the entire community indefinitely of guilt. As long as the individuals on the dock are seen in the wider context of the guilt of a community, the prosecutions can only lead to less chances of reconciliation and re-integration. More so as the individuals cut across various spectra of Rwandan society-military commanders and politicians, civilian administrators, the clergy and journalists thus seemingly representing a guilt that transcends all levels to cover each and every social rung of the Hutus. The Rwandan government, especially the judicial branch, should continue to take steps to ensure the legitimacy of its national genocide trials. The Rwandan society will benefit from fair and neutral judicial process than quick trials that seem to reflect political expedience as opposed to law. If the Rwandan justice system does not establish itself as a fair and just system, it could just as easily contribute to the cycle of vengeance as it could to ending it. On going conflict in the region and atrocities over which the ICTR has no jurisdiction should fall within the purview of the domestic justice process which is not straitjacketed by a Security Council mandate as the ICTR is. Selective enforcement of the law against
Hutu's will not help dispel the ethnic venom of hatred which needs to be dispelled through both positive political goodwill as well as legal impartiality.
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The establishment of the ICTR and its singular focus on the prosecution of a miniscule fraction of the perpetrators of the genocide was initially a woefully inadequate way to redress the brutal murder of millions of Rwandans. However, the ICTR's initially sterile approach has subsequently been supplemented by conflict management and resolution measures. These developments have been important in laying ground for a new paradigm combining the actor-oriented and structure-oriented perspectives, promoting an international law that truly permeates the human populace, not stopping at the gates of the State but bridging the gap between collective and individual actors better than it had done before. The key condition for such change is consciousness, and more sensitivity to the actor-structure relationship. Alongside trials, the outreach centre will facilitate dissemination of information that will help the two communities understand the weakness of the social structure and help ensure that the Rwanda situation is not simply a change of guard, one ethnic hegemony for another. 155 See generally, ICTR Statute, art. 23. 156 The Commission of Experts, established by the United Nations in 1994 to investigate crimes in Rwanda, concluded in their report that although they were unable to uncover any evidence that Tutsis had intended to destroy the Hutu ethnic group within the meaning of the Genocide Convention of 1948, there was overwhelming evidence to prove that Tutsis has committed crimes against humanity and serious violations of international humanitarian law. 
